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THE TRAVEL ACT: ITS LIMITATION BY THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF
LOCAL POLITICAL CORRUPTION
We believe that in cases of local political corruption, the
concept of federalism should be used as a sword. By so stating,
we do not mean to imply that our system of federalism should be
applied with blind deference to a concern for national supremacy.
However, in a constitutional system in which there is a sensitivity
to the legitimate interests of both state and federal governments,
it should be recognized that local concerns are furthered by the fed-
eral government's attempt to use its resources to assist in excising
the malignancy of local political corruption.'
Official corruption has been prosecuted in the Seventh Circuit with
increasing success in recent years. Federal jurisdiction over largely intrastate
activity has been invoked under a variety of sections of the 'United States
Criminal and Internal Revenue Codes, 2 resulting in convictions of public offi-
cials. 3 The federal government has justified its prosecution of such activity
by asserting that the states need its aid where, due to political considerations,
local states' attorneys display a reluctance to prosecute and punish influential
wrongdoers.
4
1. Brief for Appellee at 94, United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970) (conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) (mail fraud);
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1970) (perjury); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970) (Travel Act); 26 U.S.C.
§ 7201-06 (1970) (tax evasion).
3. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974) (conviction of Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge who was a former Illinois
governor and conviction of former Illinois Director of State Department of Revenue);
United States v, Bush, 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975) (press secretary of the Mayor of
the City of Chicago); United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
43 U.S.L.W. 3675 (1975) (former Cook County Illinois Clerk. Another Cook County
Clerk, Matthew Danaher, died while under indictment, United States v. Danaher, No.
74 CR 306 (N.D. Ill., filed April 10, 1974)); United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875
(7th Cir.), reh. denied, 517 F.2d 53 (1975) (en banc) (alderman Chicago City Coun-
cil); United States v. Potempa, No. 73 Cr. 736 (N.D. Ill., filed Oct. 12, 1973) (guilty
plea) (alderman Chicago City Council); United States v. Wigoda, 521 F.2d 1221 (7th
Cir. 1975) (alderman Chicago City Council); United States v. Jambrone, No. 72 Cr.
805 (N.D. Ill., filed Oct. 25, 1972) (alderman Chicago City Council); United States
v. Kuta, 518 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1975) (alderman Chicago City Council); United States
v. Hubbard, No. 71 Cr. 796 (N.D. Ill., filed Aug. 11, 1971) (guilty plea) (alderman
Chicago City Council); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975) (alder-
man Chicago City Council); United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974) (Chicago police officer); United States v. Braasch, 505
F.2d 139 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3551 (1975) (19 police officers-not
a complete list, over 50 Chicago police have been convicted or pleaded guilty).
4. Various sources have voiced the necessity for the government's intervention
into such local matters. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
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One method by which the federal government has exerted such control
is through its regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 5 An
act which falls within the scope of such regulation is the Travel Act.6 Its
purpose is to deny use of the facilities of interstate commerce for certain
enumerated unlawful activities. Exertion of jurisdiction under such an act
within the context of our system of federalism poses peculiar problems in its
drafting and construction. On the one hand, the federal government desires
to assist local governments in combating pernicious activities which cross state
lines or affect interstate commerce. On the other, it is reluctant to alter
federal-state relationships by escalating minor state crimes into federal felon-
ies. 7 Further, the federal government does not wish to strain limited federal
police resources by extending jurisdiction to areas which have traditionally
been limited to the states.
Mindful of these ends, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has en-
grafted onfo the statute a condition that prior to the invocation of the Act
a substantial and integral use of interstate facilities must be demonstrated.
This note will discuss whether invocation of the Travel Act should in fact
depend upon substantial use of interstate facilities, especially in cases of
local political corruption.
CRIMINAL LAWS, WORK No PAPERS 54 (1970); Comment, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 361, 367
(1957): "(W)here prosecutors owe their positions to the patronage of local officials,
their interest in shielding the errant ways of their colleagues may sterilize the criminal
law;" Brief for Appellee at 57-58, United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir.),
reh. denied, 517 F.2d 53 (1975) (en banc).
5. See Note, The Scope of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Commerce
Clause, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 805; Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution, 3 MINN. L. REV. 289 (1919); Stem, The Commerce
Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Interstate Crime, 15 AIuz. L. REV. 271 (1973).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970) provides:
Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enter-
prises
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facil-
ity in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to-(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity;
or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the
promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful
activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts
specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.(b) As used in this section "unlawful activity" means (1) any business
enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal excise tax has not
been paid, narcotics or controlled substances (as defined in section 102(6) of
the Controlled Substances Act), or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws
of the State in which they are committed or of the United States, or (2) extor-
tion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which committed
or of the United States.(c) Investigations of violations under this section involving liquor shall
be conducted under the supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury.
7. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 55-61 (1973);
United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir.), reh. denied, 517 F.2d 53, 55 (1975)
(en banc).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TRAVEL ACT
The Travel Act was introduced in the Senate April 18, 1961 on the
recommendation of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy,8 as part of his pro-
gram to combat organized crime. 9 As originally drafted by the Justice
Department, the Act was designed to make a federal felony out of travel in
interstate commerce to further unlawful business enterprises involving gam-
bling, narcotics, prostitution and liquor offenses, crimes typically committed
by organized racketeers. It was also designed to proscribe travel to further
extortion or bribery not necessarily involving a business enterprise.
The Senate changed the bill in two significant ways. First, on the
recommendation of New York Senator Kenneth B. Keating, it extended the
bill's proscription to interstate transportation as well as travel. Second, it
added as a requirement that the traveler perform some act in furtherance
of the unlawful activity subsequent to his travel. 10 The addition of this
requirement was affected on the urging of North Carolina Senator Sam J.
Ervin who feared the Act as drafted would have punished for nothing more
than having a criminal "intent.""' The Senate passed the bill July 28,
1961.12
The House limited the bill in two ways. First, it limited the extortion
and bribery sections to extortion and bribery arising out of narcotics, prostitu-
tion, gambling and liquor violations. Second, it combined the Keating
8. S. REP. No. 644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). The bill was introduced by
Mississippi Senator James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
9. See KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WrrmN 265 (1960), "If we do not on a national
scale attack organized criminals with weapons and techniques as effective as their own,
they will destroy us;" Kennedy, The Program of the Department of Justice on Organized
Crime, 38 N.D. LAWYER 637 (1963).
10. S. REP. No. 644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). The Senate also amended the
bill to limit business enterprises involving liquor to those enterprises on which the Fed-
eral excise tax had not been paid "so as not to involve the Federal Government in petty
offenses at the State or local level which may involve the sale of liquor." Id. at 2.
11. Hearings on the Attorney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and
Racketeering Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. at 258
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]:
Senator Ervin: As a legislator, I have very considerable misgivings for passing
any law which would subject a man to criminal punishment in the absence of
any corpus delecti merely because of some mental intent, fundamentally some
mental intent, he may entertain but never carries out, and allows a man no
place for repentance.
Senator Kefauver: As I understand it, Senator Ervin, you would want to re-
quire-and I think there is a good deal of logic in it-that not only there be
an unlawful business activity in New York, but that the man who went from
New York to Florida must not only go there with the intent, but he must actu-
ally do something after he gets there, to the State of Florida.
Senator Ervin: I would say that there ought to be additional evidence. There
ought to be a burden on the State to show that he did something besides merely
having a mental intent, plus the fact that he has crossed a State line.
I think at least there ought to be some evidence that he attempted to com-
mit a crime or that he is guilty of some overt act in furtherance of the crime.
12. 107 CONG. REc. 13,942 (1961).
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amendment with the first section. 13  Although the House reported that in
making the combination, it made "no substantive change in the provisions
of the bill," the addition of the "any facility in interstate commerce" language
in the new section appears to have greatly broadened its scope. 14 The bill
passed the House as amended August 21, 1961.1
The Department of Justice was opposed to the change made to the
extortion and bribery sections of the Act.'6 Deputy Attorney General Byron
R. White wrote in a letter to the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee
that the change eliminated other crimes committed by organized criminals,
such as loan sharking and labor extortions. 17
Following the passing of the bill by the House, the Senate asked for a
conference. The conference issued a report on September 11, 1961 outlining
compromises reached by it.i s The House agreed to not limit the extortion
and bribery sections of the bill in connection with gambling, liquor, narcotics
or prostitution. The Senate conferees agreed to accept the House combina-
tion of the first section relating to travel and the second section, prohibiting
transportation in interstate commerce, apparently not recognizing the result-
ant broadened scope of the bill.19 On September 13, 1961, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952, "Interstate and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racke-
teering Enterprises" became law.20
As adopted, the Act had three elements. First, the government must
prove interstate travel or any use of an interstate facility to distribute pro-
ceeds of, commit crimes of violence to further, or otherwise promote or man-
age one of the enumerated unlawful activities. Second, an intent to engage
in one of the activities must be proven. Third, a performance or an attempt
13. H.R. REP. No. 966, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961).
14. The Keating amendment read, in part, "Whoever uses any facility for transpor-
tation in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to .... ." S.
REP. No. 644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). The House change read: "Whoever travels
in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce,
including the mail, with intent to .... ." H.R. REP. No. 966, supra note 13, at 1. For
a discussion of the extent of the change, see United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 679-
80 (2d Cir. 1973); Pollner, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's Legislative Program
to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering, 28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 37, 40 n.22 (1961).
"Therefore, if one travels or uses any facility in commerce including the mails, tele-
graph, cable, telephone, etc., to distribute the proceeds, commit a crime of violence, or
otherwise facilitate, the defined unlawful activity, and thereafter performs or attempts
to perform any of those acts, he is encompassed by this measure, and commits a federal
felony. This indeed is a far reaching amendment."
15. 107 CONG. REc. 16,540 (1961).
16. Pollner, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's Legislative Program to Curb
Organized Crime and Racketeering, 28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 37, 41 (1961).
17. Id.
18. See H.R. REP. No. 1161, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 4 (1961), for a discussion
of the amendments by the Managers of the bill for the House.
19. Id. at 3. The House Managers also agreed to the Senate limitation of the liq-
uor violation.
20. Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-228, 75 Stat. 498.
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to perform one of the activities after the travel or use of an interstate facility
must be demonstrated. The unlawful activities were divided in-to two groups.
The Act defined the first group as any business enterprise involving gambling,
narcotics, prostitution, or liquor upon which the federal excise tax had not
been paid. The second group of activities was defined as extortion or
bribery.21
In drafting the bill, the goal of the Department of Justice and Congress
was to deny the facilities of interstate commerce to organized racketeers.
The bill was expressly designed to defeat the machinations of organized
racketeers "living in one State and controlling the rackets and reaping the
profits from these rackets located in another State."' 22  The consensus of the
testimony at the congressional hearings concerning its adoption acknowledged
that the bill was designed specifically to combat organized crime. 23  Attorney
General Kennedy testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that only
the federal government could stop organized racketeers' interstate distribution
of the proceeds of their activities. 24
The bill attempted to reach organized crime by its definition of unlawful
activities proscribed under the Act. The first group of unlawful activity con-
stituted business activity involving gambling, narcotics, liquor on which fed-
eral excise tax had not been paid, or prostitution offenses. The Attorney
General told the Senate committee that only travel to further an activity
where there was sufficient conduct to characterize it as a business enterprise
was forbidden. The Act did not ban travel to further sporadic or casual
involvement in such offenses. 25 Social gamblers would not be prosecuted
under the Act, for example, since a social poker game violative of the laws
of a given state would not involve sufficient activity to be considered part
of a "business enterprise."'26 This requirement was not necessary where the
underlying offense was extortion, bribery or arson.
The addition of the "thereafter" requirement was the most significant
change made by Congress in light of the bill's subsequent judicial construc-
21. The Act was later amended to proscribe interstate travel or transportation to
commit arson. Act of July 7, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-68, 79 Stat. 212. Arson was in-
cluded in the second group of activities.
22. H.R. REP. No. 966, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961).
23. See Senate Hearings, supra note 11, and Hearings on Legislation Relating to
Organized Crime, Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the ludiciary, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
24. Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 16.
25. Id. See also Pollner, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's Legislative Pro-
gram to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering, 28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 37, 39 n.13
(1961).
26. See comments of Herbert J. Miller, Assistant Attorney General in Charge of
the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, House Hearings, supra note 23, at
336-348. See also Miller's colloquy with Senators Ervin and Keating, Senate Hearings,
supra note 11, at 255; United States v. Gooding, 473 F.2d 425, 427 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973).
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tion. It was originally designed to proscribe the crossing of a state line with
intent to do certain of the enumerated unlawful activities. As Senator Erwin
pointed out, the Act as originally drafted provided that a person could have
been prosecuted under the Act for the condition of his mind coupled with
interstate travel. Harris B. Steinberg, President of the National Association
of Defense Lawyers, told the House subcommittee that the Act represented
a form of thought control. He noted that the criminal law had traditionally
required that a man externalize his criminal intent with some act in order
to be liable under a statute. 27 Thus, the addition of the requirement was
intended to assure that prosecution would not be conducted foi merely enter-
taining an intent without some subsequent act. In a later case, the Seventh
Circuit pointed to this addition as proof that Congress intended to limit the
scope of the Act to substantial or integral use of interstate facilities. 28 In
adding this requirement to the Act, Congress was not concerned with what
extent the facilities in interstate commerce should be used to justify its
invocation.
In summary, the bill was drafted to combat organized crime. From its
inception, legislators and Justice Department officials viewed it as an instru-
mentality by which the growing menace of organized criminal "syndicates"
could be fought. The "business enterprise" requirement limited the applica-
tion of the statute to only those situations where sufficient unlawful underly-
ing activity was demonstrated to be sufficiently large so as to exclude social
gambling and other such situations. An underlying "business enterprise" was
not required for prosecution of travel in furtherance of extortion or bribery,
however. The requirement that some showing of subsequent activity be
demonstrated after the travel was added by the Senate out of concern that
the bill as originally drafted represented a kind of thought control, punishing
for a mere state of mind.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Since enactment, the Act has withstood constitutional challenges and has
been extended to a broad area of criminal activities. In spite of overwhelm-
ing evidence that the Act was designed to combat organized racketeers, courts
have extended it to areas where the criminal ventures were not perpetrated
by such individuals. Although the Act has been broadly interpreted, it has
not been extended beyond the plain meaning of its language.
The court noted in United States v. Roselli29 that the words of the Act
did not limit its application to organized racketeers. Acknowledging that
27. House Hearings, supra note 23, at 145. See also Report of the National As-
sociation of Defense Lawyers in Criminal Cases-Report on Proposed Federal Antirack-
eteering Legislation, House Hearings, id. at 162; Supplementary Statement of American
Civil Liberties Union on Antiracketeering Bills, Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 51.
28. United States v. Altobella, 442 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1971).
29. 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Congress intended to reach the activities of such persons through its enact-
ment, the court held that the words of the section were general, making no
restrictions to particular individuals or activities. Similarly, in United States
v. Archer,3 0 the court held that if Congress had intended the Act to apply
strictly to organized crime it would have included a definition of "organized
crime" in the statute.3 1 The words of the statute, however, do not limit its
application to organized crime.
Despite warnings that the Act as drafted was constitutionally vague3 2
or represented an infringement on the freedom to travel,3 3 the Act was
upheld on constitutional grounds.3 4 Further, its purpose was held to extend
to a broad area of criminal activities. The Supreme Court in United States
v. Nardello noted: "The Travel Act [is] primarily designed to stem the
'clandestine flow of profits' and to be of 'material assistance to the States
in combatting pernicious undertakings which cross State lines . . . . 35 In
United States v. Wechsler, the court held that a "manifest purpose of the stat-
ute is to deny the use of facilities in interstate commerce to those who would
effect a wrong on the people by corrupting public officials."'3 6
In Rewis v. United States,3 7 the Supreme Court considered the extent
to which the Travel Act was applicable. In Rewis, the defendants operated
an illegal lottery in a small Florida town, fifteen miles south of the Georgia
border. They were indicted under the Act for interstate travel to the lottery
30. 355 F. Supp. 981, 985 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 670 (2d
Cir. 1973).
31. See also United States v. Gooding, 473 F.2d 425 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 928 (1973); United States v. Barnes, 383 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1040 (1968); United States v. Mahler, 442 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 993 (1971).
32. See testimony of Harris B. Steinberg, House Hearings, supra note 23, at 146.
33. Supplementary Statement of American Civil Liberties Union on Antiracketeer-
ing Bills, Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 49-51.
34. Gilstrap v. United States, 389 F.2d 6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913
(1968); Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds,
393 U.S. 410 (1969); Turf Center, Inc. v. United States, 325 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1963);
Bass v. United States, 324 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Gerhart, 275 F.
Supp. 443 (S.D.W.Va. 1967); United States v. Cozzetti, 441 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Bash, 258 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Ind., 1966), aft'd sub nom., United States
v. Miller, 379 F.2d 483 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 930 (1967); United States
v. Zizzo, 338 F.2d 577 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965); United States v.
Smith, 209 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. III. 1962); United States v. Barrow, 212 F. Supp. 837
(E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 363 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967);
Marshall v. United States, 355 F.2d 999 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815 (1966).
35. 393 U.S. 286, 292 (1969). See also Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S.
239, 246 (1972); United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993, 1008 (D.N.J. 1968), rev'd
on other grounds, 450 F.2d 424 (3rd Cir. 1971): "It is true, no doubt, that the main
purpose in enacting Section 1952 was to attempt to curb the pollution of interstate com-
merce by elements of organized crime. However, neither the title of this Section nor
its legislative history can be relied upon to limit the coverage of the explicit language
of its text."
36. 392 F.2d 344, 347 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968).
37. 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
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by some of their customers who were Georgia residents. No evidence was
offered at trial that the defendants committed any interstate acts. 3s In hold-
ing the mere conducting of such a gambling operation frequented by out-of-
state bettors by itself did not violate the Act, the Court noted:
Given the ease with which citizens of our Nation are able to travel
and the existence of many multi-state metropolitan areas, substan-
tial amounts of criminal activity, traditionally subject to state regula-
tion, are patronized by out-of-state customers. In such a context,
Congress would certainly recognize that an expansive Travel Act
would alter sensitive federal-state relationships, could overextend
limited federal police resources, and might well produce situations
in which the geographic origin of customers, a matter of happen-
stance, would transform relatively minor state offenses into federal
felonies.3 9
Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, rejected the alternative argument
by the government that since the interstate travel by the customers was
reasonably foreseeable, the defendants were liable under the Act, noting that
it would almost always be foreseeable that some customers of an establish-
ment come from out-of-state. The Court left open the question of whether
active encouragement or solicitation would fall within the ambit of the Act.
Rewis dealt with a situation where the words of the statute did not meet
the factual situation proved at trial. The actions of the defendants were
purely intrastate. Given this fact, the Supreme Court was obliged not to
extend the Act beyond the scope of its literal language. 40
The significance of Rewis lies in the recognition that under the Travel
Act there should be a limitation to its extension. In situations where the facts
of the case clearly show the defendant has not traveled in interstate commerce
or used any facilities in interstate commerce to further the unlawful enter-
prise proscribed by the statute, Rewis would dictate the Act would not be
applicable. Rewis has been cited, as will be discussed below, in situations
where the acts of the defendants factually fall within the plain meaning of
the statute, however.
38. See Rewis v. United States, 418 F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
39. 401 U.S. at 812. This argument formed the substantial part of the defendant's
argument. See Brief for Appellant at 10, Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
40. See also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971):
There is a second principle supporting today's result: unless Congress conveys
its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the fed-
eral-state balance. Congress has traditionally been reluctant to define as a fed-
eral crime conduct readily denounced as criminal by the States. This congres-
sional policy is rooted in the same concepts of American federalism that have
provided the basis for judge-made doctrines. (citation omitted). As this court
emphasized only last Term in Rewis v. United States, supra, we will not be
quick to assume that Congress has meant to effect a significant change in the
sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.
Bass, however, was not a Travel Act case.
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Based upon its words, the Act has been upheld both constitutionally and
in a general conformity with its three-pronged requirement for invocation. In
Rewis, the court considered a factual situation which called for an extension
of the meaning of the statute beyond the meaning of its words. The case
expressed the desirability of limiting the federal police power where the intent
of Congress was not clear. Finally, in spite of overwhelming and unambig-
uous legislative history which indicated the Act was intended for organized
racketeers, it has been extended to a broad area of criminal activity. This
extension was justified by the plain words of the Act.
In contrast, when called upon to limit the statute by requiring a substan-
tial or integral use of interstate facilities, the Seventh Circuit had neither
overwhelming legislative history nor the plain meaning of the words of the
statute upon which to rely. Nowhere in the legislative history was a refer-
ence made to substantial or integral use of interstate facilities. The words
of the statute make no such distinctions. In a situation where the plain
meaning of the statute conflicts with clear legislative history, as was the case
in Roselli, the courts have construed it in consonance with its plain words.
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT: THE SUBSTANTIAL USE OF
INTERSTATE FACILITIES
The Seventh Circuit has required that as a condition precedent to the
invocation of the Travel Act, a substantial use of interstate facilities be
demonstrated. In doing so, the court has ignored the plain language of the
statute, relying on the authority of nonexistent or misinterpreted legislative
history.
The court first formulated its requirement in United States v.
Altobella.41 In Altobella, two men had extorted $100 from an out-of-state
man. The defendants photographed the victim in a compromising position
with a woman who participated in the plot. The extortion money was
obtained by the victim's cashing of a check at a Chicago hotel which was
sent through the chain of collection for payment by a Philadelphia bank.
At the outset, the court conceded that the literal terms of the Act applied
to the factual situation presented by the case: "Although the 'Travel Act'
can be read to cover this case, we have concluded that this prosecution is
beyond the limits of the criminal jurisdiction which Congress intended to con-
fer on the federal courts."'4 2 It is well settled that where a court has deter-
mined that a particular act's meaning was clear, it cannot interpret it in order
to realize a more desirable result. 48
41. 442 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1971).
42. Id. at 311.
43. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917): "Where the lan-
guage [of a statute] is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of in-
terpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no
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In spite of this, the court noted the purpose of the Act was to attack
organized crime by denying the use of interstate commerce to organized
criminals operating beyond the borders of a state. The court then stated:
"That Congress did not intend to exercise its full constitutional powers in the
area of local law enforcement is demonstrated by the wording of the Act and
specifically by the use of the word 'thereafter.' ,,44 As previously noted,45
the inclusion of the word "thereafter" arose out of a desire to avoid punishing
for a mere mental state coupled with interstate travel. The word "thereafter"
was not added to signify that use of interstate facilities had to be "significant"
or "integral" before invocation of the Act.
The court concluded: "To warrant federal intervention we believe the
statute requires a more significant use of a facility of interstate commerce
in aid of the defendants' unlawful activity than is reflected on this record." 46
The court reached its conclusion in part on the proposition that the case's
particular factual situation did not require the need for the supplementing
of state police power. "(W)hen both the use of the interstate facility and
the subsequent act are as minimal and incidental as in this case, we do not
believe a federal crime has been committed." 47
The court overturned the conviction of the two defendants in Altobella
discussion;" Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260 (1945): "The plain words and
meaning of a statute cannot be overcome by a legislative history which, through strained
processes of deduction from events of wholly ambiguous significance, may furnish dubi-
ous bases for inference in every direction;" Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949);
Harris v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 861, 864 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S.
106 (1950), in which Judge Learned Hand noted, "It is always a dangerous business
to fill in the text of a statute from its purposes, and, although it is a duty often unavoid-
able, it is utterly unwarranted unless the omission from, or corruption of, the text is
plain;" Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27 (1933), in which Mr. Justice Cardozo
pointed out: "We do not pause to consider whether a statute differently conceived and
framed would yield results more consonant with fairness and reason. We take the stat-
ute as we find it;" Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REv. 527, 533 (1947): "A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor
to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely
suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration. He must not read in
by way of creation. He must not read out except to avoid patent nonsense or internal
contradiction."
44. 442 F.2d at 314.
45. See text following note 26 supra.
46. 442 F.2d at 314. In support of this statement, the court cited United States
v. Hawthorne, 356 F.2d 740 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908 (1966). In Haw-
thorne, the defendant traveled from his home in Indiana to West Virginia where he sub-
sequently set up a supper club which provided gambling facilities in violation of local
law. Not considering the issue of whether the travel was an integral part of his gam-
bling operation, the court held the purpose of the trip was "not sufficiently related to
his gambling enterprise . . . . It is not the intent of the statute to make it a crime
per se for one who operates a gambling establishment to travel interstate." Id. at 741-
2. Hawthorne held that the purpose of the travel must be to further the unlawful enter-
prise. Lacking such a purpose, the statute clearly does not apply. It did not hold that
the travel had to be a substantial part of that enterprise.
47. 442 F.2d at 315.
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because it "believed" that essentially a crime of state, and not federal, interest
had been committed. In reaching such a conclusion, it ignored a well
settled rule that judicial statutory construction is "utterly unwarranted unless
the omission from, or corruption of, the text is plain."' 48  Further, it relied
on the addition of the word "thereafter" in the statute as proof of the con-
gressional intent to limit the statute. The word "thereafter" was added for
a different purpose.
One month after the Altobella decision, the court applied the same
rationale to the interstate mailing of a small quantity of newspapers contain-
ing advertisements for salesmen for an illegal Indiana lottery in United States
v. McCormick.49 The court held the role played by the mailings was "minimal
and incidental" and "a matter of happenstance" to the lottery, citing Rewis
and Altobella. The interstate element, the court noted, was supplied by the
acts of others than the defendant and was not actively sought by him. The
"defendant neither 'used' nor 'caused to be used' any interstate facility as an
instrumental part of his illegal operations." 50 McCormick is fundamentally
different from Altobella in that there was no showing in McCormick that the
defendant used or caused to be used facilities in interstate commerce. In
Altobella, the defendants clearly caused the use of the interstate facilities.
In that sense, McCormick can be distinguished from Altobella, and its
progeny, United States v. Isaacs.5
In Isaacs, the negotiation of three checks designed to deliver the
proceeds of a bribe was held to be an insufficient use of interstate facilities
to justify invocation of jurisdiction. The defendants deposited the checks in
Illinois banks, but as a result of the proximity of the drawee bank to the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank in St. Louis, Missouri, they were processed outside the
state. Relying on Altobella, McCormick and the dictum in Rewis, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the defendants' convictions on the Travel Act counts. In
reaching this result, the court noted initially it was necessary to determine
"the scope of an ambiguous criminal statute such as § 1952 .... ,,52 The
court has thus taken a step forward from Altobella by announcing the ambig-
uity of the statute and the necessity to determine its meaning. In Altobella,
the court recognized that the Act's literal terms applied to the factual situa-
tion but reversed the convictions because it "believed" the Act should not
apply. The Isaacs court announced the statute's ambiguity apparently on the
basis that since Altobella had limited it, then it of necessity was ambiguous.
48. Harris v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 861, 864 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
340 U.S. 106 (1950). It is noted that a contrary rule of judicial construction operates
when the result would otherwise be totally devoid of reason. See, e.g., Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1891). But see note 43 supra.
49. 442 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
50. Id. at 318.
51. 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
52. Id. at 1147.
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It pointed to no particular words or phrases in the statute that were
ambiguous, however.
Further, the authority for the court's statement that "More than minimal
interstate travel incidental to the alleged criminal activity was contemplated
by Congress before federal intervention would be warranted ' 53 does not stand
up to close scrutiny. In support of this statement, the court cited two sources
of authority: the Senate report5 4 and United States v. Zizzo.55 Aside
from a portion of the Attorney General's testimony on June 6, 1961 reprinted
in the report which refers to sufficient activity to constitute a business enter-
prise,5 6 no reference was made in the Senate report to a requirement con-
templated by Congress that for invocation of the Act more than "minimal
interstate travel" be demonstrated. The reference to United States v. Zizzo
concerned a "business enterprise" as well. 57 Unlike criminal instances in
which gambling, prostitution, narcotics, or liquor violations supply the under-
lying criminal activity, a conviction for -travel or use of a facility in interstate
commerce to further extortion or bribery does not require a showing of a
business enterprise. 58
Aside from the persuasiveness of A ltobella and McCormick, it should be
noted that the court had no authority for ruling in the manner it did. The
Senate report which the court quoted contained no reference to a requirement
that the interstate travel or use of facilities in interstate commerce be more
than minimal.59 Rather, the Senate report made reference to the Attorney
General's assertion that the underlying activity could not be sporadic or casual
for the establishment of the business enterprise requirement of the Act. The
cited case similarly dealt with a gambling enterprise and the amount of
activity necessary to establish it as a "business enterprise."
53. ld.
54. S. REP. No. 644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
55. 338 F.2d 577 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
56. S. REP. No. 644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961).
57. 338 F.2d at 580.
58. See Marshall v. United States, 355 F.2d 999 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
815 (1966); United States v. Feudale, 271 F. Supp. 115, n.4 (D. Conn. 1967); United
States v. Archer, 355 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 670
(2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Gooding, 473 F.2d 425 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 928 (1973).
59. The lsaacs court cited the Senate Report as reprinted at 1961 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2664, 493 F.2d at 1147. The House Report, not the Senate Report, is re-
printed in that volume. If the Isaacs court had intended to cite the House Report, there
would still be no authority for its position. As noted above, the position the House took
in relation to the extortion and bribery sections of the Act were later revised by the
Senate. See text following note 12 supra. Further, the House Report contains no refer-
ence to "minimal interstate travel" in relation to extortion or bribery. At one point in
the report, reference was made to the use of the term "business enterprise:"
The use of the term "business enterprise" requires that the activity be a contin-
uous course of conduct. Thus, individual or isolated violations would not come
within the scope of this bill since they do not constitute a continuous course
of conduct so as to be a business enterprise.
H.R. REp. No. 966, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961).
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Based upon such an inaccurate reading of the legislative history, the
court therefore undermined the authority of Altobella, stating that it was
because of such a Congressional expression that the convictions of the defend-
ants in A ltobella had to be reversed. Clearly the Congress made no such
"expression." Based on this, the Isaacs court held:
These same considerations apply with equal force to the three
checks forming the basis for the § 1952 counts here. They, too,
were incidental to the scheme; checks which would have cleared
through Chicago, rather than through St. Louis could just as easily
have been utilized.60
In both Isaacs and Altobella, the court eschewed -the doctrine that criminal
statutes must be strictly construed where their meaning is clear. The govern-
ment argued alternatively that the Travel Act should be upheld because the
bribery of public officials was a more serious crime than at issue in Altobella
-- essentially suggesting that another exception be engrafted onto the statute.
The Court declined to make such an exception. In rejecting the argument,
the court relied on strict statutory construction:
The government, nevertheless, argues that the present case is
distinguishable since the interstate activity here was in furtherance
of a far more "serious" offense than the extortion scheme in
Altobella. But although bribery involving state officials con-
cededly is a more "serious" crime, the legislative history and
§ 1952 itself draw no distinctions between serious and insubstantial
state offenses. Rather, the test for application of § 1952 is the
nature and degree of interstate activity in furtherance of the state
crime. 61
In light of its willingness to add a condition to the Act concerning substantial
use of interstate facilities, which was not contained in its words, the reliance
on the words of the statute and absence of pertinent legislative history to dis-
tinguish away the government's final contention was utterly inconsistent. 62
Altobella and Isaacs involved factual situations where there was proof
of use of interstate facilities with intent to promote an unlawful bribery or
extortion with some subsequent act "thereafter." In order to prevent applica-
tion of the Act, the Seventh Circuit was compelled to create a requirement
which did not appear in the wording of the statute. Further, prior to
60. 493 F.2d at 1148.
61. Id.
62. It is noted that none of the commentators who have discussed the Act ex-
pressed any requirement of substantial use of interstate facilities for its application. See
Pollner, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's Legislative Program to Curb Organized
Crime and Racketeering, 28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 37 (1961); Miller, The "Travel Act":
A New Statutory Approach to Organized Crime in the United States, 1 DUQUESNE L.
REV. 181 (1963); Comment, 20 N.Y.L.F. 177, 182-3 (1974), "The wording of the stat-
ute is clear. . . . There is no mention in either the statute or the Congressional de-
bates that there must be 'extensive use' of interstate facilities to violate the law . .. ."
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A Itobella, there was no authority in either the case law or legislative history
to support such a position.63
The words of the statute did not justify the court's position in either
lsaacs or A Itobella. The legislative history in fact revealed no congressional
desire to limit the application of the bill to only situations where the use of
the interstate facility has been substantial. Only the dictum of Rewis, a case
which considered extending the Act beyond the clear scope of its words, was
correctly cited in support of the court's position in Isaacs.
THE SECOND CIRCUIT: United States v. Archer
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has faced the issue in a series of
cases culminating in United States v. Archer,6 4 but it has not held directly
that as a condition precedent to the Act's invocation a substantial or integral
use of interstate facilities be demonstrated. Rather, it has formulated the
requirement that the use of interstate facilities must be more than "a casual
and incidental occurrence" 6 5 for its invocation. Archer has not settled the
issue in the circuit, however.
Certain cases before Archer considered the question under dissimilar
factual situations. In United States v. Corallo,66 defendants were indicted
for conspiracy to violate the Travel Act 7 in a scheme to bribe the New York
City Water Commissioner. The jurisdictional element was supplied by phone
calls from the home of one of the conspirators in Greenwich, Connecticut.
63. In another recent political corruption case in the Seventh Circuit, conviction
under the Travel Act was challenged on the grounds that the use of interstate facilities
was insufficient. See United States v. Rauhoff, No. 75-1207 (7th Cir., Nov. 11, 1975).
The defendant was convicted on a twenty-one count indictment in federal district court
for the Northern District of Illinois, for his part in a scheme designed to bribe then
Secretary of State of Illinois Paul Powell and his chief purchasing agent. The goal of
the scheme was to induce Powell to award a state license plate contract to an Arkansas
manufacturing firm. The defendant and his co-conspirators promised Powell that if the
Arkansas firm received the contract, Powell would be paid $50,000 for each year the
license contract was awarded. The payment money was sent by mail to a Chicago cor-
poration which "laundered" the funds and delivered them to Powell. Since Powell de-
manded to be paid in cash, the checks from the Arkansas firm had to be cashed in Chi-
cago. Following negotiation there, they were placed in the stream of collection, crossing
state lines for payment in Arkansas. The travel of the nine checks across state lines
was the basis on which federal jurisdiction was founded for the Travel Act counts of
the indictment. The defendant argued that the cashing of such checks was an "insub-
stantial" use of interstate facilities amounting to a "mere happenstance." The Seventh
Circuit upheld the conviction applying the Isaacs test, noting that "there was significant
use of interstate facilities, and 'thereafter', to use the statutory term, significant unlawful
activity took place." Id. at 7.
64. 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir.), reh. denied, 486 F.2d 683 (1973) (per curiam).
65. United States v. Corallo, 413 F.2d 1306, 1325 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
958 (1969).
66. ld.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970).
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The court deemed the calls sufficient for the Act's invocation.68 In United
States v. Marquez,6 9 the defendants conducted an illicit gambling activity in
New York while one of them was a resident of New Jersey. The court
deemed his travel from his home to the unlawful activity sufficient in spite
of the fact he argued that the travel was not essential to nor a substantial
part of the scheme.
70
In United States v. Kahn,71 three trips were made between New York
and Johnstown, Pennsylvania in furtherance of a scheme to pay off the
mayor and two city council members of Johnstown for their securing a cable
television contract. The defendants contended the transactions were isolated
and not connected with a comprehensive scheme of racketeering and hence
should have been overturned, citing Rewis and the Seventh Circuit decisions.
The court distinguished Altobella and Rewis factually. It noted in Rewis,
the gambling operation was local. In Altobella, the victim's activity supplied
the requisite use of interstate facilities. In McCormick, a newspaper shipped
out-of-state supplied the requirement. "The common thread through each
of these decisions is that the defendants themselves engaged in no interstate
activities, and that the total interstate travel aspect of the enterprises was
either marginal or unforeseen."'72  The court noted that Rewis cited with
approval cases where agents or employees of defendants crossed state lines
to further unlawful activities.
In Archer, the court directly considered the issue under an unfortunate
factual situation. The federal government, in an apparently overzealous
attempt to clean up the New York criminal justice system, arranged a scheme
whereby a government undercover agent would be falsely arrested and
charged for a gun violation. Later, according to their plan, he would attempt
to have the charges against him dropped by offering bribes to law enforce-
ment officials. The plan involved perjury before a grand jury and New York
jurists as well as lying to police by a government agent. The government
apparently believed that such behavior would result in ferreting out malefac-
tors in the Queens district attorney's office. The interstate requirement was
supplied by three phone calls: by a government agent to a defendant from
Paris, France; by a defendant to New Jersey to two government agents who
had traveled there for the sole purpose of receiving the call in order to supply
the interstate requirements; and by one of the defendants to Las Vegas,
Nevada in an unsuccessful attempt to get in touch with an undercover agent.
Two of the calls were easily disposed of: the calls made to New Jersey
were manufactured by the government and "Whatever Congress may have
68. For other situationE where the Travel Act was invoked, see United States v.
Desapio, 435 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999 (1971); United States v.
Cassino, 467 F.2d 610 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
69. 424 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
70. Id. at 240.
71. 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973).
72. Id. at 285.
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meant by § 1952(a)(3), it certainly did not intend to include a telephone
call manufactured by the Government for the precise purpose of transforming
a local bribery offense into a federal crime."173 The second, the calls to Las
Vegas, represented a government plant and further, no actual use of inter-
state facilities was demonstrated. The court then addressed the problem of
the third call from Paris by a government agent. The court pointed out that
the call was not planted as the Newark call was, nor was the agent sent
abroad for the sole purpose of making it. The call, however, "served no pur-
pose that would not have been equally served by a call from New York."'74
That the call was being placed from Paris was "a matter of indifference" to
the defendants. The court concluded that the Paris call was a "casual and
incidental occurrence" as in Corallo amounting to a mere "happenstance" in
Rewis. On petition for rehearing, the court appeared to limit its ruling to
the strict factual setting presented by the case:
While the Government professes alarm at the precedential
effect of our decision, we in fact went no further than to hold that
when the federal element in a prosecution under the Travel Act
is furnished solely by undercover agents, a stricter standard is
applicable than when the interstate or foreign activities are those
of the defendants -themselves and that this was not met here. We
adhere to that holding and leave the task of further line-drawing
to the future.75
The court's opinion on the petition for a rehearing retreated from its
original opinion in overturning the convictions. The court no longer relied
on a "significantly meaningful" use of interstate activities as grounds for over-
turning the convictions. Rather, the court held the presence of an under-
cover agent demanded a stricter standard for invocation of the Act. Such
a ruling would have little precedential value in an Isaacs or Altobella factual
situation where no undercover agent is involved. 76
73. 486 F.2d at 681.
74. Id. at 683.
75. Id. at 685-6.
76. See United States v. LeFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288, 1293 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 1446 (1975).
The other circuits have not considered the question within the context of Altobella,
Archer, and Isaacs. In United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967), the court adopted a broad application of the statute. Re-
sponding to the defendants' argument that the government was required to prove that
the interstate travel was an integral part and essential to their gambling operation, the
court held:
The enactment prohibits in the broadest terms interstate travel with the requi-
site intent followed by the performance or attempts to perform any of the acts
specified in subparagraphs (a) (3), supra. There is nothing therein which lim-
its its application to interstate travel essential to the unlawful activity.
363 F.2d at 65.
The issue has not been raised in the Fifth Circuit, but see United States v. Ippolito,
438 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971). There, the defendant used
a wire facility to carry on an unlawful gambling enterprise. The proof showed the facil-
ity was used on four different occasions within a twelve day period.
Nor has the Sixth Circuit faced the issue, but see United States v. Compton, 355
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STRICT STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
The Fourth Circuit has not required that substantial use of interstate
facilities be demonstrated for invocation of the Travel Act.7" It has flatly
rejected the Seventh Circuit rule. Noting there is no reference in the statute
itself to substantial or integral use of interstate facilities, that court has
refused to imply such a distinction. It has held that to do so would be
beyond the scope of judicial authority.
In United States v. Wechsler,78 the court upheld a Travel Act convic-
tion of a local zoning board official. 79 Jurisdiction was based on an out-of-
state check he -received as a bribe. The court noted: "When one deposits
a check, there would seem to be little doubt that he is using a facility in inter-
state commerce." 80
In United States v. Salsbury,"' a Maryland gambling operator used a
local druggist as a money order and check cashing service. The money
orders and checks represented payment of gambling debts of the defendant's
customers. Some of the checks were drawn on out-of-state banks, thereby
supplying the jurisdictional element for assertion of the Act. Neither the fact
that the defendant received cash before they cleared out-of-state banks, nor
the fact that the druggist, not the defendant, started the chain of collection
was deemed sufficient to defeat jurisdiction.
The defendant argued that the legislative history indicated that a check
drawn on an out-of-state bank did not fall within the proscription of section
F.2d 872 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 951 (1966), where the defendant set up a
gambling casino in Tennessee one month after moving there from Arkansas. "The ac-
tual change of his residence to another State was only incidental to the accomplishment
of this purpose and thus falls within the purview of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 1952." Id.
at 875. United States v. Chambers, 382 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Barnes, 383 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1040 (1968). The issue
has not been expressly considered in the Ninth Circuit. But see United States v. Mah-
ler, 442 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993 (1971); Marshall v. United
States, 355 F.2d 999 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815 (1966).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970).
78. 392 F.2d 344 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968).
79. The issue was first considered in the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Ger-
hart, 275 F. Supp. 443' (S.D.W.Va. 1967) in which operators of a local gambling casino
were indicted for the interstate negotiation of checks drawn on out-of state banks. The
checks represented payments of gambling debts. The defendant claimed not to come
within the wording of the statute since, he contended, Congress clearly did not intend
the Act to cover such a local situation. The court replied:
(R)egardless of the thought culminating in the genesis of § 1952 defendant
comes clearly within the wording of the statute as enacted. . . . Where there
is no expression of an intent by Congress to narrow the application of a statute
beyond the common understanding of the scope of its language, I would not,
even if I could, engraft one.
275 F. Supp. at 455. Relying on the plain meaning of the words of the statute, the
court held the Act covered the defendant's activities.
80. 392 F.2d at 347, n.3.
81. 430 F.2d 1045 (4th Cir. 1970).
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1952. The court responded that an examination of the legislative history
revealed no situation in which a gambler could avail himself of interstate
facilities to clear checks representing the proceeds of his unlawful activities.
"Nor does it matter that the use of interstate facilities was tangential to the
major part of Salsbury's gambling operation, since § 1952 requires only that
the use 'carry on or facilitate the carrying on' of the illicit enterprise. '8 2
The defendants in United States v. LeFaivre, 3 were indicted under the
Act for their participation in a Baltimore gambling operation. Jurisdiction
was established by introduction of fourteen out-of-state checks which crossed
state lines in the process of collection. The checks represented payment of
outstanding gambling debts of the operation's customers. Citing the Seventh
Circuit cases, the defendants argued that their gambling enterprise was local
and their use of interstate facilities was merely incidental to their scheme.
They contended Wechsler and Salsbury were rendered inapplicable by Rewis.
Although the defendants raised no constitutional objections to the Act,
they argued at the outset that the Congress ought not to make laws which
primarily affect local activities. The court responded: "We think the argu-
ment is addressed to the wrong forum and that it is not for the courts to inter-
pose restraints so long as the Congress has acted within the proper scope of
its powers. '8 4
The LeFaivre court rejected the defendants' argument that use of inter-
state facilities had to be shown to be substantial on the basis that the plain
language of the Act dictated application.
The Congress chose to trigger application of the Travel Act by the
use of "any facility in interstate or foreign commerce." It did not
provide that such use must be "substantial" nor, so far as we can
ascertain, has it ever done so in any other federal criminal statute
pegged to the use of interstate facilities. The Congress did not ex-
clude from application of the statute the use of facilities in
commerce that might be termed "minimal and incidental," nor has
the Supreme Court done so, we think, in Rewis.85
The court noted that the facts of Rewis did not meet the literal requirements
of the statute.8 6 Only after this was determined did Mr. Justice Marshall
consider the legislative history and aspects of federalism. 87 In the situation
presented by Rewis, the court observed, it is appropriate to examine legisla-
tive history in order to determine whether extension of the statute would
further the purpose of Congress.
When, however, a statute clearly covers a given activity, the court
"should accept the statute as written and avoid plunging into the murky
82. Id. at 1048.
83. 507 F.2d 1288 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1446 (1975).
84. Id. at 1290.
85. id. at 1294.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970).
87. 507 F.2d at 1295.
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waters of legislative history"' 8 to determine whether Congress attempted in
fact to reach it. The words clearly covered the activity presented to the court
and therefore no inquiry was made into the legislative history to determine
the meaning Congress intended the words to have. If the words of the stat-
ute had been unclear, the court's approach would necessarily have been dif-
ferent.8 9
The Seventh Circuit has not concurred with the approach taken by the
Fourth Circuit. The court chose to ignore the statement by the Fourth Cir-
cuit that the depositing of a check in a bank was use of a facility in inter-
state commerce. 90 It noted that the statement implied that a check would
not to have to travel interstate but merely be deposited in a bank which is a
facility of interstate commerce for invocation of the Act.91 The Isaacs court
has acknowledged that the language of the Fourth Circuit has recognized a
broader interpretation of the statute than it was prepared to give the Act.
It noted, however, that the activities in Salsbury would have fallen within
the purview of the Act even under the restrictive reading given the statute
by the Seventh Circuit.
The LeFaivre court expressly considered the "substantial use" interpre-
tation of the Seventh Circuit. It also considered the Second Circuit view.
The court distinguished the cases factually. It noted that in Altobella, the
court based its decision in large part on a lack of any significant criminal
activity after the use of the interstate facilities-an essential requirement of
the Act. In McCormick, the defendant did not use or cause to be used any
facility in interstate commerce nor did he employ any salesmen from outside
the state of Indiana. In Archer, the court was largely concerned with the
government's participation in the unsavory plot and the fact that it instigated
the scheme. The facts of LeFaivre contained no such activity and therefore
the court considered Archer plainly distinguishable. Although aware of
Isaacs, the court did not discuss the case. 92
Thus, in its discussion of the cases which have considered the issue,
LeFaivre pointed out that they could arguably be confined to their own facts.
If they could not be so confined, the court expressly declined to follow them
and "reject(ed) any narrowly restrictive reading of the Act."'9 3
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1297, n.12.
90. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1149 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974).
91. id. See United States v. LeFaivre, 507 F.2d at 1291, n.5.
92. 507 F.2d at 1292, n.6.
93. Id. at 1294. For other Fourth Circuit cases where the use of the interstate
facility could be described as minimal, but where the issue of substantiality was not
raised, see United States v. Parzow, 391 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 823
(1968) (mailing of stock certificates representing a bribe payment from the District of
Columbia to Virginia); United States v. Baggett, 481 F.2d 114 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1116 (1973) (per curiam) (negotiation of one check representing a bribe pay-
ment from Maryland to the District of Columbia).
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AN ALTERNATIVE: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
In situations where the criminal activity is intrastate and not dependent
on interstate facilities for its commission, the desire of the court to limit fed-
eral jurisdiction is understandable. Yet it is outside the scope of judicial
authority for courts by strained interpretations to further such policies.
Rather, the several United States attorneys have it within their power to
simply refuse to prosecute a case when they deem it primarily one of state
interest. As Archer noted, responsibility for limiting expanding federal
criminal jurisdiction lies first with the United States attorneys "under the
active guidance of the Attorney General. ' 94  LeFaivre voiced a similar
solution:
How far Congress should extend federal criminal jurisdiction
is a matter of interest and concern to the judicial branch. But reso-
lution of the question is not for us ...
We think the solution to the problem of expanding federal
criminal jurisdiction is not for the courts to deny that the jurisdic-
tion exists and that Congress may implement it but instead for the
executive branch to exercise wisely the discretion vested in it by
the Congress. 5
The study draft of the National Commission on Reform of the Federal
Criminal Law96 offered the same recommendation. The fact that Congress
has established federal jurisdiction does not mean that it must be exercised
to its fullest extent. 97
Where the use of interstate facilities is minimal and where the crime
is essentially one of state interest, the United States attorney could merely
decline prosecution in the federal court under the Act and turn over whatever
information that has been gathered to local authorities. Such a solution
would not force the courts to go through semantic gymnastics in order to con-
fine a crime essentially of state interest to the state courts.
The alternative, as the LeFaivre court pointed out, is to force courts to
delve into the "murky waters of legislative history" when the meaning of an
act is quite clear. The result is to make an essentially unambiguous statute
extremely unclear, with various conditions precedent engrafted onto it which
are not apparent from a mere reading of it. In United States v. Vitich,98
in attempting to determine "the significance of the role of the interstate
activity" 99 as required by Altobella, the court noted that applying such a
standard is extremely difficult, "since there is no measurable standard for
94. 486 F.2d at 678.
95. 507 F.2d at 1296.
96. U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY
DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1970).
97. Id. § 207.
98. 357 F. Supp. 102 (W.D. Wis., 1973).
99. Id. at 104.
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determining the significance of interstate activity in an unlawful enter-
prise."'100 Aside from the difficulty in applying such a test, the statute's
application will necessarily vary from circuit to circuit, resulting in a lack of
uniformity of federal law.
As LeFaivre and Archer conclude, the several United States Attorneys
are better able to judge policies for prosecuting certain activities and individ-
uals than the courts. Further, enforcing policy considerations, however laud-
able, by way of judicial interpretation represents a possible infringement on
the prosecutorial power of the executive. 101
CONCLUSION
Two approaches have been taken to application of the Travel Act.
One, in the Seventh Circuit and to a certain extent in the Second Circuit,
demands that as a condition precedent to the Act's invocation a substantial
use of interstate facilities be demonstrated. The other, in the Fourth Circuit,
relies on strict statutory construction. The Fourth Circuit, it is submitted,
has adopted the better view.
The Seventh Circuit ignored the plain meaning of the Act in adopting
its test. Further, it misinterpreted legislative history which it was not
required to examine under well settled rules of statutory construction. The
test was created because the court believed a crime of state, and not federal,
interest had been committed. This test is extremely difficult to apply since
"substantial use" of an interstate facility is a subjective standard which can
vary from case to case. The inescapable result of the adoption of such a
standard will be an adventious application of the statute. The condition,
also, is not apparent on a reading of the statute.
The Fourth Circuit construed the Act on the basis that if an act is clear,
a court may not interpret it to further policy considerations, however sound.
Relying on the plain words of the statute avoids the difficulties of irregular
application, lack of uniformity in the circuits, and the presence of unseen
additions to the statute.
In political corruption cases, where the unique facilities of the federal
government and its law enforcement agencies are more suited to conduct
100. Id.
101. The United States attorney's discretion in bringing prosecutions cannot be in-
terfered with by the judiciary. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965):
Although as a member of the bar, the attorney for the United States is an offi-
cer of the court, he is nevertheless an executive official of the Government,
and it is as an officer of the executive department that he exercises a discretion
as to whether or not there shall be a prosecution in a particular case. It fol-
lows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts
are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the
attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.
See also Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1868); United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (dictum).
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prosecutions and where there is sometimes a reluctance on the part of local
prosecutors to conduct such cases, such construction of the Travel Act, as well
as other federal statutes, is especially egregious. The courts should not
hinder the legitimate interest of the federal government in prosecuting such
cases:
At a time when the institutions of government, both local and fed-
eral, are being subjected to increasing attack and cynicism, those
responsible for the enforcement of the law and the administration
of justice cannot afford to allow one of the most powerful means
of combatting official corruption to be emasculated by an unwar-
ranted, restrictive interpretation.
10 2
Although the federal government should clearly not exert control over
intrastate activities when not empowered to do so by Congress, prosecution
should be permitted when the acts of the defendant fall within a clearly
drawn federal statute, such as the Travel Act. Unwarranted judicial con-
struction is especially dangerous in the area of political corruption since often
no alternative prosecution is available.
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